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ABSTRACT
The paper examines the background of the Shuttle avionics system design and the unique drivers
associated with the redundant digital multiplexed data processing system. With flight software
pervading to the lowest elements of the flight-critical subsystems, it was necessary to identify
a unique and orderly approach of verifying the system as flight-ready for STS-1. The approach
and implementation plan is discussed, and both technical problems and management issues are dealt
with. A summary of "lessons learned" completes the presentation.
BACKGROUND
Before addressing the subject of this paper, it would be worthwhile to summarize the salient fea-
tures of the Shuttle avionics system in preparation for the subsequent discussion (fig. 1).
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FIGURE I.- AVIONICS SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL DIAGRAM.
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1. The primary flight system (PFS) design is based on a centralized set of quad-redundant gen-
eral-purpose computers (GPC's) within the data processing system (DPS) which provides the primary
mode of acquiring flight-critical sensor data, processing the data, and, finally, generating and
delivering guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) commands to the various vehicle control elements
(fig. 2).
2. Additionally, a single GPC with independently designed and coded flight software, called the
backup flight system (BFS), is available to take over vehicle control through the primary bus struc-
ture from the PFS, if necessary.
3. The DPS bus structure contains 24 separate serial digital input/output (I/0) buses including
8 flight-critical (GN&C) and 5 intercomputer (ICC) buses, which provide for sensitive data communica-
tions and control through the GPC redundant set.
4. The various multiply redundant inertial navigation and flight control sensors and effectors
must be in a constant state of readiness to perform the fault detection, isolation, and reconfigura-
tion (FDIR) functions.
5. The avionics and nonavionics system management (SM) function is performed in conjunction
with the operational instrumentation (01).
6. A three-string electrical power distribution and control system provides single fault-
tolerant power to non-flight-critical systems and dual fault-tolerant power to flight-critical sys-
tems (fig. 3).
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FIGURE 2.- ORBITER DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM.
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During the early years of the Space Shuttle Program, the avionics system was defined and under-
stood with regard to design requirements from the top downward, and it was assumed that the methods
used for system certification during the Apollo Program would suffice for the Shuttle. However, it
became apparent, as the various subsystem designs matured, that software would be increasingly domi-
nant in the system functions. In fact, the flight software would pervade throughout multiple levels
of the various elements as evidenced in the GN&C system (fig. 4).
With the significant improvements in capability of digital flight computers, the increasing im-
portance of software within a hardware design was not unexpected. The unexpected factor was the time
phasing of the software code design and development, which, because of the need to understand first
the hardware design and operating characteristics, lagged behind the hardware in subsystem test readi-
ness. A significant dilemma that emerged was a means of testing and certifying the lower level sub-
system elements in a reasonable time phase in the program with already developed hardware and imma-
ture flight software.
The complexity of the problem became apparent during laboratory testing of the various avionics
subsystems which were to be employed in the Orbiter 101 (Enterprise) Approach and Landing Test (ALT)
Program at Edwards Air Force Base in 1977. During the la Drab	 tort' test period, which preceded the
flights by a year, concern was generated because of confusion arising in the following areas.
1. The scope of hardware certification, which generally was thought to be stand-alone line re-
placeable unit (LRU) (i.e., black box)testing, and its relationship with subsystem- and s stem-
level function and performance testing, usually requiring some of the flight software a ements in com-
bination with hardware LRU's
2. The scope of testing necessary to declare the system ready to fly as compared to the test
and analysis necessary to provide specification compliance
3. Visibility of the requirements to meet both flight-readiness and specification compliance
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FIGURE 4.- ORBITER GUIDANCE AND CONTROL ELEMENTS.
In 1978, following the ALT Program, several members of Rockwell and NASA engineering management
met for the purpose of addressing the previously mentioned problems before the onset of Orbital
Flight Test (OFT) preparations. At the meeting, it was decided (1) to modify the scope and relation-
ship of the Orbiter LRU certification and necessary subsystem- and system-level avionics tests and
analyses, hereinafter called verification, (2) to differentiate between mission-to-mission flight
readiness during OFT and operational readiness indicated by specification compliance, and (3) to de-
velop a mission-to-mission verification process with adequate rigor and visibility necessary to iden-
tify the specific requirements to meet flight readiness during OFT.
GENERAL APPROACH
To establish a verification process, it was first necessary to establish the relationship be-
tween hardware and software. In the case of the Orbiter DPS, flight software elements which were com-
monly resident in the GPC's supported the lowest level hardware LRU's. To treat these software ele-
ments, which effectively stand alone in function, and their hardware LRU counterparts as functioning
subsystems, the software elements were also called LRU's. Simply stated, verification may be de-
fined as higher level tests and analyses above the LRU certification level necessary for compliance
with predefined requirements. For purposes of Shuttle avionics verification, the various levels
range from the lowest stand-alone functional element (actuation subsystem) to the highest level of
integrated vehicle elements (mated Shuttle vehicle), as shown in figure 5. This definition also
infers that the avionics verification process would transcend project-level boundaries between
the various vehicle elements and would, indeed, be an integrated avionics verification process.
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As a result of the 1978 discussions, it became apparent that it was neither necessary nor possi-
ble to complete all verification tests and analyses required to achieve specification compliance
before the first OFT flight (STS-1). Instead, it was decided to address flight-readiness verifica-
tion on a mission-by-mission basis. The cumulative mission verification effort coupled with a de-
fined analytical effort became the building blocks to complete specification compliance verifica-
tion (fig. 6). Finally, it was evident, because of the system complexity, that a highly visible and
rigorous process must be in place to assure that the necessary tests and analyses had been completed
to provide confidence in declaring system flight readiness.
FIGURE 5.- SHUTTLE LRU CERTIFICATION AND SUBSYSTEM-
	
FIGURE 6.- RELATIONSHIP OF FLIGHT-READINESS
AND SYSTEM-LEVEL VERIFICATION.	 VERIFICATION TO TOTAL VEHICLE SPECIFICATION
COMPLIANCE VERIFICATION.
In the case of the DPS and the GN&C system, the design teams were in place and were sensitive to
the relationship of their respective technical disciplines with the integrated avionics system. This
was not necessarily the case for the nonavionics disciplines, for which sequencing, control, and sys-
tan management functions for power generation, mechanical, and propulsion systems were provided as a
service by the DPS. To provide verification requirements visibility within the nonavionics systems,
three-man subsystem teams, consisting of one each software, hardware, and test specialist familiar
with each of the subsystem designs, were formed. They were responsible for using the various sub-
system specification and design documents to define a bottom-upward approach to the verification
requirements.
In the case of all systems, as the requirements were identified, they were mapped, using as a
reference hardware, drawings, software specifications, certification, qualification test, acceptance
test plans, and designer insight. The resulting "roadmap" identified the type of analysis, labora-
tory, and/or flight vehicle test necessary to accomplish verification for that specific element, func-
tion, or subsystem. Each roadmap stood alone but provided the foundation for higher level elements
in the verification tree (fig. 7). Each roadmap evolved into a verification plan which was jointly
negotiated between the Rockwell sponsor responsible for design and acceptance in the respective tech-
nical discipline and the NASA counterpart. Tests and analyses were conducted and results jointly
reviewed by the sponsors. The final conclusions were documented in a Verification Completion Notice
(VCN), which was signed by the sponsor counterparts. The resulting documentation (verification plan,
VCN, and associated test and data requirements documents) provided the desired rigor and traceability
to the process.
In summary, the role of the technical sponsors was the keystone to the verification process.
Each was charged with the responsibility of defining the verification requirements, determining the
method of test or analysis to meet requirements, defining the criteria for test site acceptance,
determining the data requirements for the tests, determining the pass-fail criteria for those data,
resolving test anomalies, reporting the test results, and, finally, determining the flight readiness
of his function or element. It is now appropriate to describe the technical and management tools nec-
essary to make the verification process work.
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FIGURE 7.- OFT FLIGHT-READINESS VERIFICATION PROCESS.
DESIGN VERIFICATION APPROACH
The avionics design verification approach employed the following methodology.
1. Divide the total avionics system into technical disciplines.
2. Utilize the best technical resources for verification; i.e., assign the best technical per-
sonnel as verification sponsors for each technical discipline and determine the best combination of
test and analysis tools for the job.
3. Establish a framework for avionics integration.
Figure 5 shows the application of this logic tree process to the lowest levels. As a basis for the
verification, the sponsors treated both the hardware and the software LRU's as flightworthy elements;
i.e., the hardware LRU's were certified to withstand the flight environments, and software was in-
dependently tested to show requirements compliance.
The sponsor's challenge was to demonstrate the flightworthiness of his respective hardware
or software element to accomplish the mission. The following tools were used as appropriate.
1. Hardware and software laboratories and test facilities
2. Analysis programs
3. Airborne test articles
4. Shuttle flight vehicle prelaunch testing
The use of the flight vehicle was very restricted. The strategy was to perform the bulk of verifica-
tion through laboratory testing and analysis.
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HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE LABORATORIES AND TEST FACILITIES
The Flight Systems Laboratory (FSL) at Downey, California (fig. 8), and the Shuttle Avionics In-
tegration Laboratory (SAIL) at the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC), Houston, Texas (fig.
9), had been developed as the primary test facilities for avionics verification. Because of avionics
system complexity and for schedule considerations, the SAIL was developed for the ascent flight phase
and the FSL was developed for the descent flight phase. The FSL and the SAIL shared the on-orbit ver-
ification. Both facilities provided system-level open- and closed-loop capability, and SAIL possessed
a complete set of flight-type avionics hardware and cable harnesses.
Other hardware test facilities included the Flight Control Hydraulic Laboratory (FCHL), the JSC
Electronics Systems Test Laboratory (ESTL), Thiokol, the Main Propulsion Test Article (MPTA), and the
NASA George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Main Engine Simulator. Using these facilities,
the sponsor would typically develop and validate math models, establish open- and closed-loop func-
tion and performance, and confirm hardware-to-hardware and hardware-to-software compatibility.
Before a facility was used for formal verification, the sponsors performed site acceptance testing
using off-line analytical data as a reference. Site acceptance provided sponsor confidence in facil-
ity representation of the flight article.
ANALYSIS PROGRAMS
The sponsors used analysis programs to confirm stability and to verify dynamic performance
considering nominal and off-nominal conditions. The sponsors developed the analysis programs in par-
allel with the system design, development, and verification testing. The fidelity of the analysis
programs was updated by correlating their performance with test results. Eventually, the analysis
programs became key off-line analysis tools that could repeat test results and expand operating condi-
tions by parametric changes to establish envelopes about the design nominal. These analysis tools ef-
fectively supplemented the hardware test articles for complete system verification.
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AIRBORNE TEST ARTICLES
The Shuttle Training Aircraft (STA) and the SR71 flight test program supplemented avionics veri-
fication by providing in-flight characteristics to enhance sponsor understanding. Limited but valu-
able flight insights were derived through use of this technique.
SHUTTLE FLIGHT VEHICLE PRELAUNCH TESTING
Ground testing of the actual vehicle to be flown provided an extremely beneficial understanding
of specific flight vehicle characteristics. In addition to the rigorous ground checkout process,
which was an independent key element for committing to flight, specific verification ground tests
were accomplished on the flight vehicle. These tests required a higher level of assembly and integra-
tion than could prudently be accomplished in a laboratory. End-to-end flight control tests, dynamic
stability verification, and simulated integrated mission runs were typical types of tests. Because
these tests used both flight hardware and flight software, extremely high preflight confidence in the
integrity of the flight article was obtained.
To complete the framework for the avionics integration, a challenge emerged which required the
NASA and contractor institutional managers to coordinate their various technical resources and meet
a time-critical flight-readiness schedule.
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MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE
Because the various elements of the integrated avionics system were being developed by three
NASA field centers and numerous contractors, it was necessary to provide some means of unified con-
trol. The myriad of diverse program elements (fig. 10) had to be integrated by a process capable of
developing the confidence necessary to ensure that the avionics hardware and software system was
ready for flight within a defined time schedule. The control mechanism had to be capable of provid-
ing communication among the various program elements, system technical areas, and program management.
It also had to be capable of controlling all aspects of the avionics verification process without
restricting the feeling of personal accountability. In addition to providing for program biases, the
management function also had to be responsible for assuring availability of the tools necessary for
providing the test and the analysis data base required for proof of system flight readiness.
Taking into account these fragmented but critical activities, the complexity of the avionics sys-
tem, and the magnitude of verification requirements, it was necessary that specific management con-
trols be provided. These included the following.
1. Obtain and maintain the commitment from the technical sponsors to do the verification job.
2. Provide interface between the program elements.
3. Allocate test facility resources.
4. Resolve issues.
5. Secure flight-readiness commitment from the sponsors.
6. Provide program management with focused visibility of verification progress and bring forth
unresolved issues.
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Early in 1978, the avionics verification management was established to provide these controls. It
encompassed all aspects of avionics verification and was focused through a management review team,
which presided over and administered the avionics verification activities. The team consisted of man-
agers from each aspect of avionics verification, as follows.
Management Working Group (MWG) Membership
NASA
	
Rockwell
Systems Engineering	 Systems Engineering
SAIL	 FSL
NASA John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Engineering 	 SAIL
GN&C Engineering	 KSC Engineering
Flight Software Engineering
The MWG was provided with tools to assure their ability to control the process. These tools
consisted of the following.
VERIFICATION LOGIC TREE
The verification logic tree (fig. 11) defined the scope of avionics verification. It provided
a single source to relate the individual subsystem function to other elements in the integrated
avionics system. Each subsystem function is depicted in a block on the tree; relationships of sub-
functions are listed below each block. The tree provides a "bottom-up" hierarchy of subsystem func-
tions (such as flight control) to the higher functions (such as descent GN&C) and then to the top
function (integrated avionics). The verification logic tree provided a reference tool with which
to measure the verification progress, to establish priorities, and to determine areas requiring
additional emphasis.
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INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY MATRIX
Related to the verification tree was the matrix of sponsor accountability. As previously men-
tioned, success of the verification process depended on the involvement of the avionics system de-
sign personnel. This involvement was assured by developing an accountability matrix based on the
verification logic tree and assigning the appropriate NASA and Rockwell counterparts to each sub-
system or function and by obtaining commitments from line management that avionics verification
sponsorship was truly the individual's assigned task. In other words, the process was totally
reliant on the design community for the technical effectiveness of avionics verification. With-
out the commitment of the proper personnel to the process and the backing of the process by pro-
gram management, it would not have been possible to integrate and manage the effort required for
commitment to flight readiness.
MANAGEMENT WORKING GROUP
The MWG was the forum for administering the avionics verification process. It met weekly by
teleconference to review progress of avionics hardware and software system verification and to re-
solve issues impacting the process as shown in figure 12. Specifically, the functions of the MWG
were as follows.
1. Review and baseline the verification tests for each flight.
2. Review and approve changes to the baseline for new requirements (mission changes, software
changes, or delivery schedules).
3. Establish test priorities.
4. Review laboratory schedules.
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5. Identify laboratory problems, hardware availability issues, and manpower assignments that
must be taken to program management for resolution.
6. Review verification issues.
The MWG provided the medium for sponsor interface with the laboratories, JSC, KSC, and MSFC. The MWG
was co-chaired by Rockwell and NASA, and decisions of the MWG Board constituted direction to the veri-
fication community to proceed. Any issues which carried impacts beyond the verification community
were taken forward to program management for disposition.
FLIGHT READINESS VERIFICATION PLANS
The Flight Readiness Verification Plans (FRVP's) provided traceability to the sponsor's verifica-
tion requirements and consisted of three parts: (1) verification roadmaps, (2) verification require-
ments, and (3) an approval sheet. The verification roadmap identified the verification tasks, the
test site, and the planned schedule for the tests. The verification requirements sheet defined each
verification task in general terms and assigned a tracking number to each task. The tracking number
was used to provide traceability from the VCN back to the FRVP. The approval sheet was signed by
Rockwell and NASA counterparts after the plan and the details had been coordinated. The FRVP, in
conjunction with the verification logic tree, defined the total task, which, when completed, would
provide a data base sufficient to permit signoff at each level of the commit-to-flight process.
These two documents provided the MWG with the necessary criteria for evaluation of the criticality
of remaining effort.
SUMMARY - WITH REFLECTIONS
The resulting verification process culminated in an intense but orderly effort which provided
the necessary confidence in the Space Shuttle avionics system to perform the STS-1 mission. The proc-
ess remains in place today and is providing the necessary incremental verification to determine
flight readiness for subsequent flights.
Throughout the effort leading to the first flight, the process provided the means for success-
fully resolving the conflicts which occurred during the integration of this complex system. Typical
were the significant problems discovered within the Orbiter entry flight control system during ini-
tial verification testing. A resulting major redesign within the flight software required major
replanning and schedule changes. During this period, the working relationships among the verifica-
tion sponsors (designers), the laboratory test teams, and the flight software design and test person-
nel led to mutual respect for the common objective: "Get the avionics system ready to fly!" Their
commitment to that objective minimized the conflicts that had to be resolved. Had management, early
in the program, understood the impacts of software involvement throughout the avionics system, the
logjam of concurrent subsystem- and system-level testing resulting from late release of flight soft-
ware might have been minimized. As it was, the process lessened the logjam by integrating subsystem
requirements into system-level test runs. The message, however, remains: "In future programs, the
subsystem designs should acknowledge the need for an up-front verification strategy which minimizes
the labor-intensive laboratory test effort."
Finally, the need to involve the designer personally in the flight-readiness verification proc-
ess for future programs needs to be acknowledged. This involvement includes not only the planning
phases of the verification but also the final decisions of system flight readiness. With the in-
creased interaction of future flight systems, the individual designers must be accountable for the
readiness of their respective elements for flight.
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